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DO NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS NEED HOME RULE?
FRAYDA S. BLUESTEIN*
Local governments derive all of their powers by delegation from
states. Nationally, the scope and form of delegated authority varies.
Most states delegate broad "home rule" authority to their local
governments over matters of local concern. This Article compares
local government authority in North Carolina to local government
authority in other states. North Carolina is often described as a
"Dillon's rule" state, indicating that in the absence of home rule,
courts narrowly construe local authority under the framework
developed by Judge John F. Dillon in the late 1800s. Recent North
Carolina appellate court opinions hold that Dillon's rule has been
replaced by a legislative directive for broad construction, but that
Dillon's rule will be applied if enabling legislation is unambiguous.
An analysis of the legal structure and judicial interpretation of local
government authority in home rule states and in North Carolina
shows that despite their lack of home rule authority, North Carolina
local governments have powers effectively equivalent to those in
home rule states. The need for specific legislative authority in North
Carolina, however, limits flexibility, efficiency, and predictability.
The Article recommends changes in state law and in the legislative
process in order to clarify the applicability of the broad
construction statute and to reduce the use of litigation and local
legislation to define the scope of local authority.
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INTRODUCTION
Local governments are creatures of state government. They
have no independent recognition in our federalist system of
government and are not separately mentioned in the Federal
Constitution.' The legal recognition and authority of local
governments exists entirely by state action.2 North Carolina local
governments3 are created by the State and derive all their powers by
delegation from the State.4 In this respect, North Carolina local
governments are the same as those in other states.5
1. See 1 JOHN H. SILVESTRI & MARK S. NELSON, MCQUILLAN: THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.34 (3d ed. 1999).
By providing for a dual system of government, national and state, the United
States Constitution left with the states local government for local affairs and gave
to the nation general government for general affairs only. It does not mention
cities, towns, municipal corporations, or indeed any local organs of government.
Id. at § 1.34.
2. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,178 (1907).
3. The comparative analysis in this Article focuses primarily on cities, and not on
counties or special purpose local governments. Most national literature has this same
focus. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 354 (1990) (criticizing this focus). The discussion of authority in
North Carolina, as well as the recommendations, however, apply equally to cities and
counties in North Carolina, since cities and counties in North Carolina increasingly have a
great deal of common and overlapping authority. See Warren Jake Wicker, Introduction
to City Government in North Carolina, in MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH
CAROLINA, 3, 17-22 (David M. Lawrence & Warren Jake Wicker eds., 2d ed. 1996).
Nationally, counties have traditionally functioned as agencies of the state, administering
state programs such as court systems and human services programs, though in recent years
they have taken on more regulatory and general-purpose local government functions. See
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 8, at 26-28 (2d ed. 2001).
4. Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413,417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1994).
5. Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill, Jr., Preface to HOME RULE IN
AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK ix, ix (Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B.
Hill, Jr. eds., 2001) [hereinafter HOME RULE IN AMERICA] ("[B]ecause the legal system
of each state determines the powers that cities may exercise, local governments are often
called creatures of the state.").
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The scope and structure of delegated powers in each state are
often characterized as being either "home rule" or "Dillon's rule."
6
Home rule refers to a broad delegation of authority by the state over
matters of local concern.' Dillon's rule, on the other hand, is a rule of
judicial construction, developed by Judge John F. Dillon, which
suggests that local authority should be narrowly construed.8 As such,
Dillon's rule does not actually describe a state's local government
structure. When used to describe a state, Dillon's rule refers to the
fact that local government powers are interpreted narrowly in the
absence of a home rule provision or other legislative directive calling
for a broader interpretation. 9
Unlike most states, North Carolina local government powers are
established through specific statutory delegations rather than through
broad statutory or constitutional grants of authority over local
matters.10 This is to say, North Carolina is not a home rule state.
And although North Carolina is often described as a Dillon's rule
state, that designation is probably not accurate, at least according to
the most recent North Carolina appellate court opinions on the
subject.1 This means that North Carolina is a non-home rule, non-
6. JESSIE J. RICHARDSON, JR. ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., IS HOME RULE THE
ANSWER? CLARIFYING THE INFLUENCE OF DILLON'S RULE ON GROWTH
MANAGEMENT 1 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/
dillonsrule.pdf ("[M]ost writers, government officials and laypersons classify a state as
either a Dillon['s] Rule state or a home rule state.").
7. For a more complete definition of home rule, see infra notes 27-32 and
accompanying text.
8. For an explanation of Dillon's rule, see infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
9. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 18 (listing North Carolina as a Dillon's
rule state); James H. Svara, North Carolina, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at
312, 313 (describing North Carolina as a "modified" Dillon's rule state, taking into
consideration the legislative directive for broad construction of local government powers).
10. See Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (1994)
("[I]t is a well-established principle that municipalities, as creatures of the State, can
exercise only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them"); see also David
W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs: Dillon's
Rule, Legislative Reform, and the Current State of Affairs in North Carolina, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 671, 674 (observing that North Carolina cities and counties do not have
constitutional home rule and have limited statutory delegations to control local structural
matters).
11. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 75, 82-83, 606
S.E.2d 721, 726 (2005), discretionary review denied, 359 N.C. 629, 615 S.E.2d 660 (2005)
("[Tihe narrow Dillon's Rule of statutory construction used when interpreting municipal
powers has been replaced by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-4's mandate [for broad
construction]."). Accord Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. Durham County, - N.C. App.
- -. 630 S.E.2d 200, 203 (2006) (holding that section 153A-4 (county version of broad
construction) has replaced Dillon's rule and applies unless the statute is without
ambiguity).
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Dillon's rule state. This double negative description, however, does
not tell us much about the actual authority local governments have in
North Carolina compared to that of local governments in other states.
Understanding the actual scope and meaning of local authority
requires analysis of both the legal structure and wording of the
delegation, as well as its interpretation by the courts.
This Article describes how local government authority in North
Carolina compares with local government authority in home rule
states, and addresses the question of whether North Carolina local
governments would be better off with home rule authority. While
there are many other ways in which local authority can be described
and evaluated, the effort here is to assess the basic source and extent
of authority derived through state delegation, focusing exclusively on
the state-local relationship, and not on the federal-state-local, 2
interlocal, 3 or other relationships that may affect local power more
generally. Home rule may appear to offer broader authority and
more independence from state legislative preemption than North
Carolina's non-home rule system. 4 An analysis of states' legal
structures and judicial interpretations of local authority, however,
suggests otherwise. Grants of home rule authority in other states
generally do not create significant limitations on state preemption of
local government regulation. 5 In addition, the scope of authority
actually delegated to North Carolina local governments is probably as
broad, perhaps even broader, than the authority local governments
have in many home rule states.16
This Article begins by describing the key provisions and
predominant legal structures in home rule states and the judicial
12. For a recent assessment of federal-state-local relations, see generally David R.
Berman, State-Local Relations: Partnerships, Conflict and Autonomy, 2005 MUN. Y.B. 43.
13. For a discussion of how home rule laws affect interlocal relationships, see DAVID
J. BARRON, GERALD E. FRUG & RICK T. Su, DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE:
LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON 74 (2004), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
rappaport/downloads/home-rule/homejrule.pdf (documenting ways in which the
Massachusetts home rule system discourages interlocal cooperation); Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
19-23 (1990).
14. See ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.01, at 21-4 (2d ed. 2006)
[hereinafter ANTIEAU] (documenting the historical purpose of home rule as an effort to
provide broader authority and control to local governments and relief from the restrictive
interpretations of local authority under Dillon's rule); RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6,
at 1 ("[P]revailing sentiment assumes that Dillon's Rule entails weak local governments
and strong state government oversight, while home rule connotes great freedom for local
governments with little interference from the state.").
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part II.A.
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interpretations of the home rule provisions. Part II describes the
legal structure of local government authority in North Carolina,
including the statutory delegations as well as the judicial
interpretations of their scope. Part III compares North Carolina with
home rule states and concludes that North Carolina local
governments and home rule local governments share several
characteristics: (1) a broad delegation of authority to regulate and
address local issues; (2) a continuing presence of state preemption
through enactment of general laws; and (3) a tendency by the courts
to interpret the scope of authority narrowly or inconsistently,
regardless of how broadly the delegation of authority is worded.
Despite these common themes, the North Carolina "non-home rule"
system of specific statutory delegation has important structural
differences, which have practical effects on North Carolina local
governments as compared to those in home rule states.17
Implicit in the comparison of home rule and North Carolina local
government authority is a value judgment about an ideal or optimal
system of delegation. Many who comment on home rule and other
aspects of local government structure evaluate the desirability of the
system in terms of its promotion or frustration of particular policies,
such as urban sprawl, smart growth, or fiscal policies. 8 Consumers of
local government authority, however, comprise a diverse set of
stakeholders with a variety of perspectives. More autonomy for local
governments may be a good thing or a bad thing, depending upon a
stakeholder's particular interests. As discussed in Part III of this
Article, contradictory assumptions about the effect of increasing or
decreasing local authority can be found in the literature and suggest
that broad generalizations about how local governments nationwide
will use their authority may not be particularly useful.
This Article concludes with recommendations for improving
structural aspects of the North Carolina system to promote policy-
neutral values of flexibility, efficiency, and predictability rather than
to promote particular political or policy outcomes. Specifically this
Article recommends that the legislature: (1) use broad language in
drafting enabling legislation and avoid the inclusion of unnecessary
limitations 19 in statutory delegations of local authority; (2) adopt new
legislation clarifying the scope and applicability of the broad
construction standard courts must use in reviewing cases challenging
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
19. As explained in Part IV of this Article, unnecessary limitations are those that limit
exercise of delegated authority and do not involve important policy issues.
2006] 1987
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local government authority; and (3) delegate local authority to
conform charter provisions to the general law without legislative
approval.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN HOME RULE STATES
The United States Constitution allocates power between the
federal government and the states. It does not mention local
governments. 20  Local governments are created by states and have
neither inherent rights to their existence, nor to any particular grant
of authority. 21 As stated by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh:
22
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the
governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them
.... The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred
upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall
be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. The
State, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all
such powers, may take without compensation such property,
hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the
territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another
municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation.
All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or
without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative
body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as
it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the
United States.23
20. See Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 5, at ix ("Many people are astonished to learn
that the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of cities, counties, or any other type of local
jurisdiction.").
21. Political and legal efforts to establish inherent rights of local governments are well
documented but have not been successful. See REYNOLDS, supra note 3, § 26 at 78-79
("[T]he doctrine of inherent home rule has now been clearly rejected in almost all U.S.
jurisdictions and may thus be considered of little contemporary significance. But it has
been noted that it has a 'persistence in the romantic literature of local government law'
that often requires contrary citations simply to establish the principle's current non-
existence." (internal citations omitted)).
22. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). This case involved a constitutional challenge by citizens of a
town that was consolidated with the city of Pittsburgh pursuant to the provisions of a state
statute authorizing consolidation.
23. Id. at 178-79.
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While all states have created local governments and have granted
them authority, the structure and scope of authority varies.24  This
section describes both the legal structures and judicial interpretations
of home rule delegations, which exist in some form in most states.2
Local government powers are established in state statutes, state
constitutions, or some combination of these two sources.26 In home
rule states, local government authority over local matters is delegated
in broad terms and local governments are not generally required to
obtain specific authority for particular activities. Most states have
some form of home rule.28 Only Virginia 29 and North Carolina have
no home rule authority in either their constitutions or statutes. °
24. See Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill, Jr., Appendix: Home Rule
Across the Fifty States, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 471, 476
(summarizing the structural arrangements in each state and their impact on the
administration and functioning of local government).
25. See ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.01, at 21-4 (listing forty-three states as having
some form of home rule); Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 24, at 476 (identifying only six
states with no effective home rule: Alabama, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
and Vermont).
26. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.01, at 21-4.
27. One source defines home rule as "[t]he power of local self-government, or the
power of local governments to deal with matters of local concern without having to turn to
the state legislature for approval, as long as their actions do not contravene already
defined state policies." Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill, Jr., Glossary, in
HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 493,495.
28. It is misleading to assume that the presence of home rule authority in the
constitution means that local governments actually have home rule powers. The New
Hampshire Constitution provides for local government charters to be approved by local
referendum, but in practice local authority is limited to structural matters. N.H. CONST.
part 1st, art. XXXIX; see also John F. Camobreco & Mark V. Ebert, New Hampshire, in
HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 277, 278. The Nevada Constitution provides
for legislative creation of home rule but the legislature has not acted on that authority to
date. NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; see also Robert P. Morin & Eric B. Herzik, Nevada, in
HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 269, 270. Though there is no constitutional or
statutory provision for home rule in North Carolina, it is listed as having structural home
rule powers in a comprehensive summary of home rule in the United States. See Krane,
Rigos & Hill, supra note 24, at 476.
29. See Keeok Park, Virginia, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 427, 428.
30. The North Carolina Constitution authorizes local governments to preserve the
environment and control pollution. N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5, para. 1. In Smith Chapel
Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 348 N.C. 632, 502 S.E.2d 364 (1998), the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that this provision provides direct authority to a city to impose fees
for storm water programs despite the lack of express legislative authority for such fees. Id.
at 636, 502 S.E.2d at 367. Some argued that this reading of the constitution provided a
degree of home rule for local governments with respect to environmental issues. See
MILTON S. HEATH, JR., MEMORANDUM: NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF
RIGHTS: ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS, Jan. 1999, at 3 (describing the legislative history in
support of this argument) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). On
reconsideration, however, the court held that the city exceeded its authority in imposing
the fees based on the plain meaning of the statute authorizing imposition of fees for storm
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According to one definition, home rule is "[t]he power of local
self-government, or the power of local governments to deal with
matters of local concern without having to turn to the state legislature
for approval, as long as their actions do not contravene already
defined state policies."31 The difference between home rule and non-
home rule authority may be stated in simple terms as follows: in a
home rule state, local governments have authority to act on matters
of local concern unless a state statute preempts local action; in a non-
home rule state, local governments may act on a matter only if a state
statute authorizes local action. A home rule state is generally
understood to be one in which local governments operate under a
broad delegation of authority over matters of local concern.32
The effect of a home rule delegation is described as having two
dimensions: (1) it provides broad authority for local governments to
govern local affairs without the need for specific grants of authority
from the state; and (2) it limits interference by state legislation in
matters of local concern.33 To understand the extent to which each of
these dimensions is actually present, it is important to examine both
the language of the home rule delegation and the interpretation
courts have given that language.
A. Legal Structures in Home Rule States
Grants of home rule authority may be found in a state's
constitution, statutes, or both.3 4 Constitutional provisions that include
a direct delegation of authority without the need for implementing
water systems. See Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 812,
517 S.E.2d 874, 879 (1999).
31. Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 27, at 495.
32. See Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 24, at 471 (using a common format to describe
the various components of local authority in terms of the specific activities authorized in
three categories: structural, functional, and fiscal). The authors take the position that
"the passage of any statute or constitutional provision that enhances the authority and
opportunities for a local jurisdiction to control its own affairs can be considered as an
effort to grant an additional degree of 'home rule.' " Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 5, at
ix.
33. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.02, at 21-10; see also Terrance Sandalow, The Limits
of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 645
(1964) (arguing that home rule is better understood to be a method by which the state
distributes power rather than a condition of local autonomy).
34. See ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.01, at 21-4; RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6,
at 10-11 (describing types of home rule); see also SILVESTRI & NELSON, supra note 1, at
§ 1.41 ("[Home rule] is usually associated with powers vested in cities and towns by
constitutional or statutory provisions, particularly the former, and more especially organic
authorization to the local inhabitants to frame and adopt their own municipal charters.").
1990 [Vol. 84
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legislation are called "self-executing" home rule delegations.35 In all
other cases, the specific form and extent of delegation is a matter of
state legislative discretion.36 The specific language of home rule
delegations varies from state to state, but many contain common
elements. As described below, whether they are constitutional, self-
executing, or purely legislative, the legal structure of most home rule
delegations preserves a significant role for statewide legislation
defining the scope of local authority.
Turning first to the specific language of home rule delegations, it
is interesting to note that many of them actually reserve to the state
substantial authority to legislate through general laws.37 A typical
home rule grant authorizes a city38 to "make and enforce ... local
police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its
charter or with the general laws."39 A similar formulation grants cities
the authority to determine their local affairs and government, "not
inconsistent with the laws of the General Assembly."4  The
Washington Constitution provides that local charters are "subject to
and controlled by general laws."41
35. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.03, at 21-14. For an example of a self-executing
home rule provision, see COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
36. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.01, at 21-8 (stating that with legislative home rule, a
state legislature "is authorized to withdraw or limit home rule powers by statute").
37. Id. § 21.03, at 21-18 ("[Slome home rule states expressly permit state legislative
action even in areas of local concerns, provided the legislative action is by general law
(applicable to all similar types of local governments)." (footnote omitted)). Some state
constitutions limit the use of special or local laws on particular subjects. See, e.g., N.C.
CONST. art. II, § 24. In home rule states, limitations on local acts function to restrict state
interference with the exercise of local home rule authority. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. IV,
§ 7(10) (allowing local acts regulating the internal affairs of local government only by
petition from the local government and subject to local approval). In contrast, in a non-
home rule state such as North Carolina, local acts are most often used to create or confirm
local authority, usually at the request of the local government. See David M. Lawrence,
The Legal Nature of the City and Its Governing Board, in MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 3, at 31, 34.
38. Some provisions apply only to "charter" cities or other classifications of local
governments based on population. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; LA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5(E); MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a); NEB. CONST. art. IX, § 5; OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII,
§ 3(a); R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a.
Some states have both home rule and non-home rule cities, depending upon whether the
city has adopted a charter or is of sufficient size to be eligible for home rule powers.
Courts generally apply Dillon's rule to non-home rule cities in home rule states. See
Richard Wandling, Illinois, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 128, 130
(explaining that non-home rule cities in Illinois remain subject to Dillon's rule).
39. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added).
40. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A; see also KY. CONST. § 156b; OHIO CONST. art XVIII,
§ 3; R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. XI, § 5.
41. WASH CONST. art. XI, § 10. Another expression of home rule provides authority
over all local matters "not expressly denied by general law or charter." N.M. CONST. art.
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Legislative authority to structure or limit home rule authority is
even more apparent in states where home rule is not provided for in
the constitution but is instead a matter purely of legislative creation.42
In these states the legislature has complete discretion in developing
and modifying over time the scope of home rule authority granted,
not unlike the situation in non-home rule states. Indeed, whether the
constitution preserves legislative authority or the home rule power
originates with the legislature itself, home rule powers are often
shaped by lists of specific delegations to which the local charters must
conform.43
This summary of home rule delegations shows that while they
provide broad authority over local matters, the language of the
delegations preserves significant state legislative authority. Judicial
interpretation of home rule provisions further defines the scope of
authority to exercise particular powers at the state and local levels.
B. Judicial Interpretations of Home Rule Provisions
A key issue in cases involving the scope of home rule authority is
the appropriate standard of review a court should apply. In addition,
legal challenges in home rule states involve questions about: (1)
whether a particular local law conflicts with state law; (2) whether
local legislation overrides a state law on the same subject or whether
state law preempts local law; and (3) whether the exercise of local
authority involves a matter of local concern.
X, § 6D; see also MO. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a) (conferring all powers the legislature can
confer if consistent with the constitution and not limited or denied by statute); MONT.
CONST. art. XI, § 6 (conferring any power not prohibited by the constitution, law or
charter); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (charter city has "any power ... not denied by this
Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time"). The
Texas provision even more explicitly preserves legislative authority by including in the
home rule delegation a statement that the powers conferred are "subject to such
limitations as may be prescribed by the legislature." TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
42. For examples of legislative home rule provisions, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22,
§ 802 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3 (LexisNexis 2000).
43. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (listing specific powers granted); MICH. CONST.
art. VII, § 22 (listing specific powers granted, but with a statement that enumeration is not
a limit on the general grant of authority). Georgia law delegates authority in specific
areas, see GA. CODE ANN. § 36-34-2, and includes specific exceptions, see id. § 36-35-6
(2000). Indiana exceptions have been increasing in number. See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
3-8 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006); see also William Blomquist, Indiana, in HOME RULE
IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 139, 140 (noting that Indiana has a "growing list of
restrictions on local government powers"). Mississippi's constitutional home rule
provisions include specific exclusions on subjects such as taxation and bonds, municipal
elections, alcohol sales, and property control, which are subject to general state law. See
Annie Johnson Benifield, Mississippi, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 231,
232.
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1. Standard of Review
The form of the home rule delegation may influence a court's
approach to analyzing the scope of authority granted.44 Where a
home rule delegation includes or consists of a list of specifically
authorized powers, courts are more likely to interpret the scope of the
authority granted more narrowly, sometimes applying the Dillon's
rule analysis, discussed later in this Article.45 Courts in these
jurisdictions may employ a more restrictive standard when analyzing
whether a particular action is within the scope of the specific home
rule delegation or exclusion.' In some states, however, courts have
interpreted the grant of home rule, by itself, to constitute a rejection
of Dillon's rule, and have afforded broad deference in upholding local
exercise of authority over matters of local concern.47 For example, a
Utah court held that application of Dillon's rule eviscerates the
legislative intention behind home rule and "seriously cripples
effective local government." 4s  The court held that as long as the
action is reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives, the
44. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 11-12 (suggesting a system of classifying
types of home rule based in part on whether the state addresses the judicial interpretation
of state grants); id. at app. A at 41 (listing states according to whether or not the courts
interpret local authority using Dillon's rule).
45. See, e.g., Richard C. Kearney, Connecticut, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra
note 5, at 78, 79 (noting that Connecticut's legislative home rule takes the form of
specifically delegated powers, which are interpreted by the courts using Dillon's rule).
This form of legislative home rule is difficult to distinguish from the system of delegation
(and its interpretation by the courts) in North Carolina.
46. Indiana courts continued to apply Dillon's rule even after the adoption of home
rule, until the legislature explicitly repealed Dillon's rule in 1980 and directed the courts to
use a more liberal standard. See Blomquist, supra note 43, at 140. Similar directives to the
courts regarding the standard of review can be found in the South Carolina Constitution,
requiring that the state constitutional and statutory delegations of authority be liberally
construed in favor of local governments to include powers fairly implied and not
prohibited, see S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 17, in the Illinois Constitution, stating that "powers
and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally," ILL. CONST. art. VII,
§ 6(m), and in a Montana statute which mandates liberal construction, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-106 (2005).
47. See City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992) (holding that special
assessment is within the scope of home rule authority and delegation removes judicial
limitations); Gen. Bldg. Contractors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 66 P.3d
873, 880 (Kan. 2003) (holding that county home rule authority should be liberally
construed to allow use of eminent domain for economic development); Hospitality Ass'n
of S.C. v. County of Charleston, 464 S.E.2d 113, 117-18 (S.C. 1995) (holding that home
rule delegation abolished Dillon's rule and provides adequate authority to impose service
charge within broad grant of police power); Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 429
S.E.2d 802, 805 (S.C. 1993) (holding that home rule abolishes Dillon's rule, citing cases in
accord from other jurisdictions).
48. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).
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court should not interfere with the means chosen to carry out the
action. 9
Some home rule provisions specifically direct the courts
regarding the appropriate standard for reviewing the scope of
authority granted, in some cases explicitly rejecting the Dillon's rule
formula in favor of a more liberal construction." The Illinois
constitution calls for liberal construction of local powers,51 but
specifies that local governments may exercise power concurrently
with the state except as to those powers the legislature has restricted.2
Thus even when the constitution calls for broad construction, the
enumeration of specific powers granted or denied has the potential to
limit the scope of home rule authority.
2. Local-State Conflicts and Preemption
As noted above, many home rule provisions require that the
exercise of local government authority must not conflict with general
state laws. The judicial analysis of this issue often follows basic law
on preemption: local provisions are in conflict with general laws if
they allow what state law prohibits, or prohibit what state law
allows.53 In some states, the analysis follows implied preemption
analysis, under which the local action is invalid if the court concludes
that general laws indicate a legislative intent to foreclose local
regulations on particular subjects.54  As summarized by one court,
"[t]he doctrine of preemption is premised on the right of the state to
so extensively and intensively occupy a particular field or subject with
state laws that there is no reason for municipal regulation."55 The
potential breadth of this analysis can significantly diminish the scope
of local authority in home rule states.
49. Id. at 1127.
50. See ARK. CONST. art. X, § 1 (stating intention to provide for maximum local self-
government and requiring that power granted be given liberal construction). Indiana's
statutory home rule provisions, IND. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3-4 (LexisNexis 2000), and Iowa's
Constitution, IOWA CONST. art. III, § 38A, explicitly abrogate Dillon's rule.
51. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
52. Id. art. VII, § 6(i). The constitution does include limitations on legislative
restriction of local powers. Id. art. VII, § 6(l).
53. Cf. City of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 436 (N.Y. 2006) (invalidating a
local provision prohibiting the city from doing business with vendors that discriminate
between spouses and domestic partners in providing benefits as inconsistent with bidding
requirements in general law requiring award of contracts based on price).
54. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper County, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (S.C. 2006)
(concluding that permissive language indicates no legislative intent to occupy the field to
the exclusion of local action).
55. Nordmarken v. City of Richfield, 641 N.W.2d 343, 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
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In another home rule state case the court created the following
test for determining when local regulations are preempted: "1) has
the [state] legislature withdrawn the power of municipalities to act; 2)
does the local ordinance logically conflict with the state legislation; 3)
does the ordinance defeat the purpose of the state legislation; or 4)
does the ordinance go against the spirit of the state legislation. '56 A
similar analysis used by the Michigan courts includes as a factor
whether the "nature of the regulated subject matter may demand
exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve
the state's purpose or interest. '57  Courts determining whether
particular local actions conflict with general laws have also reached
different conclusions about whether a home rule provision authorizes
local governments to go beyond a general law, or whether this
constitutes a conflict.58
Another important issue in determining the scope of authority in
home rule states is whether the home rule provision creates any
limitation on the state's authority to enact general laws on matters of
local concern. In some cases the state's authority to enact general
laws is limited to matters of statewide concern. 9 Courts have also
held that the state retains authority to regulate even if local matters
are affected.' Some states recognize state authority over local
matters as long as legislation is enacted by general, rather than local
56. State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. County Bd. of Adjustment, 676 N.W.2d 401, 412
(Wis. 2004) (invalidating a local ordinance dealing with variances based on its definition of
unnecessary hardship); see also Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536
(Cal. 1993) ("A conflict exists if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an
area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication."
(citations omitted)).
57. Mich. Coal. for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndale, 662 N.W.2d 864, 869
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that state firearms statutes preempt local gun control
ordinance).
58. See Savage v. Prator, 921 So. 2d 51, 54-56 (La. 2006) (summarizing cases under
home rule stemming from local regulations that create higher penalties or prohibitions);
Coastal Recycling, Inc. v. Connors, 854 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2004) (holding that the
"occupies the field" argument for state preemption is at odds with the home rule provision
in the constitution); City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 714 P.2d 220, 228 (Or. 1986) (higher
penalty under local ordinance invalid).
59. See WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3(1); see also ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.05, at 21-28,
("Even constitutional home rule for local governments has not customarily denied the
state legislatures power over matters described as of 'general' or 'statewide' concern."
(citations omitted)).
60. See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. State, 730 N.E.2d 920, 925 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that
where the state has a substantial interest the state may legislate even if local interests are
also affected).
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or special laws.61 For example, in Oklahoma a state law regarding
collective bargaining was upheld when characterized as a general
law,62 even though it had previously been invalidated when
interpreted to be a special act.63
The Colorado Constitution specifically provides that local
ordinances on matters of local concern override conflicting state
laws.' In interpreting this provision, courts have acknowledged that
some issues involve matters of mixed state and local concern, and a
complex judicial standard has evolved. As set out in City and County
of Denver v. State,65 courts first determine whether the challenged law
(whether state or local) involves a matter of local, state, or mixed
state and local concern.66 In cases involving a conflict between a state
and local provision on a matter of local concern, the local provision
supersedes, as provided in the constitution.67 If the matter is
determined to be of statewide concern, the local provision is
preempted unless the constitution or state statutes provide specific
authorization to the locality to legislate in this area.68 Where the
matter is of mixed local and state concern, the local government may
act as long as there is no conflict with state law. In the event of a
conflict between a local provision and a state provision on a matter
involving a mixture of state and local interests, the state law
supersedes. The courts acknowledge that there is no fixed standard
for determining what is local, state, or mixed, and therefore apply an
ad hoc evaluation.69 The courts have identified four factors to
consider in making this evaluation:
61. See, e.g., R.I. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (stating that the state may regulate local
matters by general law except matters relating to the form of the local government); State
ex reL Worthington v. Cannon, 181 So. 2d 346, 347 (Fla. 1965) (noting that the state
constitution prohibits local acts by the state after a home rule charter is adopted).
62. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 133 P.3d 281,284 (Okla. 2006).
63. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., No. 101,729, 2005 Okla LEXIS 57,
at *39 (Okla. July 5, 2005). The lower court and a withdrawn opinion by the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held that the law was an unconstitutional special act. Id. The court's
final opinion concluded that the act, which applied to municipalities with populations of
35,000 or more, was a valid general law that did not conflict with the home rule authority
under the constitution. City of Enid, 133 P.3d at 284.
64. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
65. 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990).
66. Id. at 767.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. "[A]ffairs that are of primarily local, state or mixed concern often 'imperceptibly
merge.'" City of Commerce v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1280 (Colo. 2002) (citing City and
County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990)).
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(1) the need for statewide uniformity of regulation; (2) the
impact of municipal regulation on persons living outside the
municipal limits; (3) historical considerations, specifically
whether the matter is one traditionally governed by state or by
local government; and (4) whether the Colorado Constitution
specifically commits the matter to state or local regulation.70
The Supreme Court of Colorado applied this analysis in City of
Commerce v. State, a case in which several home rule cities challenged
state uniform laws governing the use of automatic vehicle
identification systems (red-light cameras).71 Despite prior case law
holding that traffic enforcement on local streets is a matter of local
concern, the court found that the interest in uniformity justified state
preemption.72 A strong dissent in City of Commerce and another
recent Colorado case 73 suggests that, despite the court's attempt at a
uniform standard, the challenge of identifying clear delineations of
appropriate spheres of authority between state and local entities in
home rule states remains elusive.74 The application of the Colorado
framework in these recent cases illustrates that, notwithstanding a
constitutional limitation on state preemption and the development of
a specific judicial standard, it is extremely difficult for courts to make
clear and consistent distinctions between what is of statewide, as
opposed to local, concern.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1276.
72. Id. at 1280-81.
73. In City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003), the court determined
that a local ordinance prohibiting unrelated or unmarried sex offenders from living
together in a single family residence conflicted with and was preempted by state law (held
to affect a statewide rather than a mixed state and local matter) regarding adjudicated
children living in state-created foster homes. See id. at 153. Justice Coats dissented,
stating,
In my view, the majority analysis subtly misapplies our precedent in this area in a
way that radically alters the relationship between home rule cities and the state, by
virtually eliminating the area of mixed concern, in which both city and state had
previously been permitted to legislate. Because I believe our well-established
precedent requires not only that Northglenn's ordinance be considered the
regulation of a matter of mixed state and local concern, but also that it be found to
be consistent with state law, I would uphold the validity of the ordinance and
reverse the district court.
Id. at 163-64, (Coats, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 1286 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
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3. Local Versus State Concern
It has been observed that "[tihere is no clear or workable test
separating local from state concerns. Courts have acknowledged that
there is considerable overlap in these two categories. '7 5 Matters of
local concern are sometimes defined as those whose results affect
"only the municipality itself, with no extraterritorial effects."76  In
practice, however, it appears that relatively few things have
exclusively local effects and that many are of mixed state and local
concern. As summarized in one treatise,
With an expanding view of the role of the state, many home
rule powers, aside from local government structural concerns,
have been determined to fall in the shared category. It is only
in the very limited area where a power is deemed 'exclusively'
of local concern that the state will be foreclosed from acting.
7
While courts have generally concluded that structural and
administrative functions internal to the local government are matters
of local concern," a wide range of local government activities may be
viewed as involving matters of statewide concern. These may include
general police power regulations.79 One formulation holds that
matters of statewide concern include matters involving the "health,
75. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 21.05, at 21-26 (citing Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705
(N.Y. 1929)). This problem was recognized early in the history of home rule. John F.
Dillon noted in his treatise, "[n]o general rule has been laid down defining what
constitutes municipal affairs or business, probably because it has been impossible to do so
in such terms as to furnish a satisfactory guide to the courts and the profession." JOHN F.
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 165, at 316
(5th ed. 1911).
76. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Toledo, 830 N.E.2d 1233, 1242 (Ohio Ct. App.
2005).
77. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 22.01, at 22-5 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Town and
Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 603 (Conn. 2004) (holding that procedure for adopting
town budget was a local concern, not superseded by a general state law)).
78. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 22.06, at 22-28 ("Overwhelmingly, matters pertaining
to the structure of government, qualifications of local legislators, and the enactment of
charter amendments, ordinances and resolutions are held to be local concerns." (footnote
omitted)).
79. Under the standard in Ohio, "[a] state statute takes precedence over a local
ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an
exercise of the police power, rather than of local self government, and (3) the statute is a
general law." City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ohio 2002). The Louisiana
constitutional home rule provision states that, "[n]otwithstanding any provision of this
Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged." LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(B).
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in New Orleans Campaign For a Living Wage v. City of
New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002), relied on this provision to uphold a state statute
that prohibited local governments from establishing minimum wage requirements for
private employers. See id. at 1108.
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safety, security and general welfare of all the inhabitants of the State,
and not to matters affecting merely the personnel and administration
of the offices local to [the local jurisdiction] and which are of no
concern to citizens elsewhere."8
Regulations affecting local employees provide a good example of
the difficulty courts have developing consistent rulings on what is of
state as opposed to local concern. While many judicial decisions in
home rule states have upheld local hiring and employment policy
decisions that conflict with state law,81 some matters relating to local
employment, such as civil service requirements, minimum
compensation, and retirement benefits, have been held to be of
statewide concern.' In California, the court invalidated a state
provision requiring counties to submit to arbitration holding that it
interfered with local authority,83 while in Oklahoma, collective
bargaining was held to be a matter of statewide concern."
Particular subjects may not be entirely matters of state or local
control. For example, noise may be a matter of local or statewide
concern, depending upon the nature of the regulation involved.
Local streets may generally be considered a matter of local control,
but regulation of traffic has been generally viewed as a matter of
preemptive statewide regulation.86 A local government law treatise
summarizing cases dealing with specific topics of state and local
regulation illustrates that many important functions are of mixed or
statewide concern in home rule jurisdictions, including education;
highways and streets; taxes, fees, and finances; public health;
80. Devlin v. City of Phila., 862 A.2d 1234, 1246 (Pa. 2004) (upholding the extension
of employment benefits to life partners).
81. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 22.08, at 22-23 ("Generally, matters involving local
government officers and employees are deemed local, rather than state concerns.").
82. See generally id. (summarizing cases involving local authority to adopt various
types of employment policies).
83. County of Riverside v. Superior Court, 66 P.3d 718,730 (Cal. 2003) ("John Donne
wrote, 'No man is an island, entire of itself.' So, too, no county is an island, entire of itself.
No doubt almost anything a county does, including determining employee compensation,
can have consequences beyond its borders. But this circumstance does not mean this
court may eviscerate clear constitutional provisions, or the Legislature may do what the
Constitution expressly prohibits it from doing." (citation omitted)).
84. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 133 P.3d 281, 284 (Okla. 2006);
accord City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Or. 1978)
(retirement and life insurance benefits for police and fire employees is matter of statewide
concern); City of Buffalo v. N.Y. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 363 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898
(1975) (stating that compensation of public safety employees is a matter of statewide
concern).
85. See Vill. of Sugar Grove v. Rich, 808 N.E.2d 525, 532 (111. App. Ct. 2004)
(distinguishing between local noise and train noise).
86. ANTIEAU, supra note 14, § 22.11, at 22-42.
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environment and land use; criminal law and police protections; courts;
regulation of private utilities; and local tort liability.87
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, judicial interpretations
about what constitute statewide as opposed to local issues and about
which local provisions are in conflict with general laws sometimes
have a narrowing impact on the scope of the home rule delegation.
Despite their structural and judicially created limitations, local
governments in home rule states have successfully relied on their
broad authority to support controversial local initiatives. For
example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently upheld a local
policy extending employee benefits to employees' life partners
against a challenge that the policy conflicted with state law defining
marriage.88 Home rule has also been used to uphold city regulation
and litigation regarding firearm use and manufacturing.89 Home rule
authority has been interpreted to include the authority to use eminent
domain for economic development purposes9" and to impose special
assessments91 and fees to offset the cost of development.' Court
opinions in these cases often reflect deference to the legislative
intention to delegate broad authority and to provide flexibility in the
means of carrying out that authority.93
On the other hand, controversial issues are often the subject of
state preemptive action. For example, limitations on lawsuits against
gun manufacturers are among the general laws that limit local
authority, even in home rule states.94 And recent reaction to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New
London95 has included proposed legislation that would limit use of
87. Id. § 22, at 22-39.
88. Devlin v. City of Phila., 862 A.2d 1234, 1247 (Pa. 2004).
89. See City of N.Y. v. Berretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256, 273 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (upholding city's authority to sue gun manufacturers); Richard Briffault, Home Rule
for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 254 n.7 (2004) (summarizing cases
analyzing local authority to regulate firearms).
90. Gen. Bldg. Contractors, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 66 P.3d 873,
880 (Kan. 2003).
91. City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So. 2d 25, 28 (Fla. 1992).
92. Hospitality Ass'n of S.C. v. County of Charleston, 464 S.E.2d 113,118 (S.C. 1995).
93. See Glasscock Co. v. Sumter County, 604 S.E.2d 718, 722 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(upholding a local exception to competitive bidding requirements and stating that to rule
otherwise "would effectively strip our state's local governments of any flexibility in
determining the competitive procurement policies and procedures appropriate for them to
adopt").
94. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 64.045 (LexisNexis 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
115 (2005).
95. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). This United States Supreme Court decision held that the
condemnation at issue did not violate the Federal Due Process Clause. Id. at 2665. State
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eminent domain for economic development and would expressly
preempt local authority in home rule jurisdictions.96  As one
commentator has noted, "what the legislature has given, it may take
away.
97
It is difficult to generalize based on the case law about the overall
effect of state preemption in home rule states on the exercise of local
authority. The cases do not reflect the many local government
activities that are not challenged in court. Contemporary assessments
of home rule in some states do indicate that it provides a good deal of
flexibility within the scope of powers that are not preempted. 98 A
recent national survey of local government home rule suggests,
however, that the expectation that home rule creates local autonomy,
including freedom from or limitations on the states' authority to
preempt, has been largely disappointed. In Home Rule in America:
A Fifty-State Handbook, a comprehensive summary of home rule
among the fifty states, numerous entries begin or end by noting such
disappointment.99 This publication also notes that citizens in some
constitutions or laws may still limit governmental use of eminent domain for economic
development purposes.
96. See, e.g., S.B. 2683, 94th Gen. Assem. Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2006) (seeking to preempt
home rule and create a statewide prohibition on the use of eminent domain for economic
development); OHIO LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE REPORT 11, http://www.greaterohio.org/
documents/ohio-ed-tf-inital-findings.pdf (proposing statewide definition of blight for use
of eminent domain).
97. Sandalow, supra note 33, at 647.
98. See Briffault, supra note 89, at 254 (summarizing cases upholding exercise of local
authority under home rule in matters involving controversial issues such as local tobacco
and firearm regulation, gay and lesbian rights, domestic partnership ordinances, campaign
finance reform, and living wage provisions).
99. See Benifield, supra note 43, at 239 (Mississippi: "[lIt is difficult to ascertain the
implications of [home rule] provisions, since the constitution and statutes micromanage or
mandate so many policies."); John G. Bretting, New Mexico, in HOME RULE IN
AMERICA, supra note 5, at 295, 301 (New Mexico: "The notion that broad functional
home rule exists is an exaggeration."); Paul Coates, Jack Whitmer & Tom Bredeweg,
Iowa, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 148, 148 (Iowa: "For cities, the
promise of home rule has been disappointing because it has not resulted in any significant
independence from state interference."); Lon S. Felker, Michael P. Marchioni & Platon N.
Rigos, Tennessee, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 391, 397 (Tennessee:
"[H]ome rule is just a concept, and one of limited importance in the realm of state local
relations .... [I]t is difficult to argue that home rule municipalities have fared better
fiscally or politically than their general law or private act counterparts."); Kearney, supra
note 5, at 84 (Connecticut: "In many important respects, local autonomy is a popular
myth in Connecticut."); Dale Krane, Nebraska, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note
5, at 258, 258 (Nebraska: "[M]any observers believe that 'for all practical purposes, home
rule in Nebraska does not really exist.' " (quoting Arthur B. Winter, Nebraska Home Rule:
The Record and Some Recommendations, 59 NEB. L. REV. 601, 626 (1980))); Morin &
Herzik, supra note 28, at 269 (Nevada: "Home Rule exists in name only."); Platon N.
Rigos, John J. Bertalan & Richard C. Feiock, Florida, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra
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home rule states have chosen not to pursue local government charters
even when they have the option to do so by local initiative."° It has
also been observed that the usefulness of home rule may be more
influenced by the political, economic, historical, and other social
factors that are present in a particular state rather than by the
governing legal structures. 10 1
Certainly the desire for greater autonomy from state interference
with local government activity has been an important motivation
historically for advocates of home rule.1°2 While advocates of home
rule or greater local autonomy may view statewide legislative efforts
as interference, others suggest that this is and has always been a
fundamental aspect of the relationship in which the state has absolute
note 5, at 94, 94 (Florida: "[T]he meaning of home rule is dubious .... [H]ome rule
powers ... are less than what they appear to be on paper."); Robert A. Schuhmann,
Wyoming, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 462, 462 (Wyoming: "[M]any
local officials believe that home rule has not turned out to be the gift originally
intended."); James B. Weatherby, Idaho, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at
120, 120 (Idaho: "Home rule in Idaho is more myth than reality."); Philip H. Wichern,
Minnesota, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 224, 226 (Minnesota: "[I]n
practice, the powers and form of governing in most home rule cities are similar to those
found in statutory cities.").
100. See Krane, supra note 99, at 259; Tim Schorn et al., South Dakota, in HOME RULE
IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 383, 383; Felker et al., supra note 99, at 392 (citing
Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee as examples of this trend).
101. The summaries of individual states in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5,
document how economic, financial, and political factors affect the extent to which local
governments exercise significant independence. See Meredith Ramsay, Massachusetts, in
HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 203, 205 (Massachusetts: "Regardless of
formal decision-making structures, political and economic forces in the larger environment
strongly affect home rule powers."); Alvin D. Sokolow & Peter M. Detwiler, California, in
HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 58, 58 (California: "[Local] discretion,
however, is now compromised by constraints on local government revenue authority-a
result of the gradual abandonment of the property tax as a local revenue source and the
domination of state fiscal rules."); Clive S. Thomas, Anthony T. Nakazawa & Carl E.
Shepro, Alaska, in HOME RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 33, 33 (Alaska: "[L]ocal
control ... depends on political considerations, especially at the state level, despite the
strong constitutional provisions.").
102. See Dale Krane, Platon N. Rigos & Melvin B. Hill, Jr., Introduction to HOME
RULE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 1, 11 ("This reform strategy was known as the home
rule movement and originally was conceived as a means for ending the interference of
local state legislative delegations in municipal affairs." (citing ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA,
DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 90 (1996))). On the contrary, David Barron has argued that there were
competing visions within the home rule movement some of which actually sought
limitations on local government authority by pointing out that "[t]hrough complex
combinations of state law grants and limitations, these home rulers highlighted,
empowered, even created those aspects of the 'local' that seemed to serve their desired
substantive ends. Those aspects of the 'local' that seemed antithetical to their particular
reformist visions would be suppressed, limited, even erased." David J. Barron, Reclaiming
Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2321 (2003).
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power over local governments."a 3 Despite this sense that home rule
either should or does involve substantial autonomy and freedom from
state interference, the legal structure of home rule rarely incorporates
meaningful limitations on the state legislature's ability to enact laws
governing a wide variety of issues that might be considered to involve
matters of local concern.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN NORTH CAROLINA
As noted earlier, North Carolina is one of only a few non-home
rule states.1°4 As the following description shows, despite the lack of a
broad constitutional or statutory recognition of local government
authority over matters of local concern, North Carolina local
governments have been delegated extensive authority. Judicial
interpretation of the scope of this authority, however, has been
inconsistent and at times restrictive.
10 5
A. Authority by Statutory Delegation
North Carolina local government authority exists by statutory
delegation. There are provisions in the state constitution that relate
to local governments, but they either authorize the legislature to
enact laws relating to local governments or provide limitations on
local government actions. I0 6 The provisions neither confer nor
mandate establishment of specific local authority."7 As the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has stated, "[i]t is a well-established
principle that municipalities, as creatures of the State, can exercise
only that power which the legislature has conferred upon them.
°10 8
103. See Sandalow, supra note 33, at 645 (arguing that home rule is a method by which
states distribute their power, not a condition of local autonomy); RICHARDSON ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 7 ("[T]he term 'home rule' has acquired an almost talismanic aura over
the years and often, inaccurately, connotes almost total freedom of local governments
from state control.").
104. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
105. See infra Part II.B.
106. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for the
organization and government and the fixing of boundaries of counties, cities and towns,
and other governmental subdivisions, and, except as otherwise prohibited by this
Constitution, may give such powers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other
governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable."); id. art. VII, § 3 (delineating the
authority of merged or consolidated local governments); id. art. V, § 2 (delineating the
scope of local authority to levy taxes and authorizing the legislature to enact laws allowing
local governments to contract with private parties for a public purpose); id. art. V, § 4
(establishing limitations on local debt); id. art. II, § 24 (limiting local legislation on listed
subjects, but not limiting state preemption by general laws on these subjects).
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417,451 S.E.2d 284,287 (1994).
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There is nothing in the constitution or other law that limits the extent
to which the state can withdraw or preempt authority previously
delegated to local governments. 109 In addition, the scope of authority
delegated, as well as the possibility of implicit preemption, are subject
to interpretation by the courts.
I When compared to the broad delegations typical of home rule
states, North Carolina local governments' dependence on specific
statutory delegation together with the unlimited power of state
preemption of local authority may seem somewhat restrictive. The
statutory delegations to local governments in North Carolina,
however, actually encompass quite a broad range of powers and
authority. Enabling laws in the North Carolina General Statutes,
Chapter 160A (governing cities)" and Chapter 153A (governing
counties)"' provide local governments substantial authority in a wide
range of areas. Most significant is the broad grant of general police
power authority. Under this authority, cities and counties may, by
ordinance, "define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or
conditions detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens
and the peace and dignity of the [city or county]; and may define and
abate nuisances."' 2 For cities, the statute provides that ordinances
must be consistent with the laws and constitutions of North Carolina
and the United States."3  State courts have held that the same
limitation applies to counties. 14 Beyond this limitation, these broad
grants of police power authority do not contain specific procedural or
other limitations. More specific statutes authorizing police power
regulation also exist, such as those authorizing regulation of
begging," 5  sexually oriented businesses, 16  noise regulation,"7
possession or harboring of dangerous animals, 8 and removal and
disposal of abandoned and junked motor vehicles.1'9 A separate
109. See Owens, supra note 10, at 674 (citing N.C. CONST. art. VII, § 1, which gives the
state authority for organizing and creating the powers and duties of local governments in
its discretion).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-1 to -676 (2005).
111. § 153A-1 to-473.
112. See § 153A-121(a) (counties); § 160A-174(a) (cities).
113. See § 160A-174(b) (enumerating conditions that would constitute inconsistency,
essentially codifying the tests for explicit and implicit preemption that a court would
apply).
114. See Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 45, 565 S.E.2d 172, 176 (2002); State
v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238,247, 185 S.E.2d 644, 650 (1972).
115. See § 160A-179.
116. See § 160A-181.1.
117. See § 160A-184.
118. See § 153A-131.
119. See § 153A-132; § 160A-303.
[Vol. 842004
HOME RULE
statute specifically provides, however, that the enumeration of
specific regulatory powers is not intended to limit the general
authority granted in the broad delegation of ordinance-making
authority.2 0 Both cities and counties also have extensive authority to
regulate land use and development.1
2 1
State statutes also authorize local governments to operate listed
public enterprises'22 and to operate other facilities including libraries,
public recreation facilities, hospitals, and animal shelters. 23 While the
activities authorized for cities and counties have become increasingly
overlapping, there are some activities that only cities are authorized
to conduct and some that are exclusive to counties. Most notably,
road construction and maintenance is limited to cities and the state,
while counties have exclusive local responsibility for funding public
schools and for administering a number of state-mandated functions,
such as public health, mental health, and social services. Counties
also have primary local responsibility for courts. 24
Local governments in North Carolina also have authority to
generate revenue through the property tax (subject to specific
limitations as to uses and amount),25 local option sales taxes, 26
special assessments (for listed purposes),'1 7  user fees,' 28  and
miscellaneous other local taxes and charges. 29 Cities and counties
120. See § 153A-124; § 160A-177.
121. See § 153A-320 to -390; § 160A-360 to -459. For an analysis of the statutory
authority North Carolina local governments have in the area of smart growth initiatives,
see Owens, supra note 10, at 673.
122. See § 153A-275; § 160A-312. Authorized public enterprises for both cities and
counties are wastewater, water, public transportation, solid waste collection and disposal,
off-street parking, airports, and storm water management programs; and for cities only,
electricity, cable television, and gas. See § 153A-274; § 160A-311.
123. See § 131E-7; § 153A-263; § 153A-442; § 160A-353; § 160A-493.
124. A. FLEMING BELL, II AND WARREN JAKE WICKER, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN
NORTH CAROLINA 904 (4th ed. 1998); Wicker, supra note 3, at 18 (listing forty-four
services authorized for both cities and counties, fifteen for counties only, and eight for
cities only).
125. See § 153A-149; § 160A-209.
126. See § 105-465; § 105-483.
127. See § 160A-216; § 153A-185.
128. Specific statutes authorize some user fees, as in the case of public enterprises. See
§ 160A-314, § 153A-277. In its decision in Homebuilders Association of Charlotte v. City
of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 442 S.E.2d 45 (1994), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held
that local governments have implicit authority to charge reasonable fees to defray the
expenses of regulatory programs. Id. at 46, 442 S.E.2d at 51. But see Durham Land
Owners Ass'n v. Durham County, - N.C. App. -, -, 630 S.E.2d 200, 206 (2006) (holding
that counties do not have authority to charge impact fees for school construction).
129. See generally DAVID M. LAWRENCE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE IN NORTH
CAROLINA (2d ed. 1990) (detailing North Carolina law governing local government
finance).
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have specific authority to engage in a wide range of activities to
promote local economic development. 3 North Carolina cities have
authority to annex property, including by petition from affected
property owners,' as well as on the cities' own initiative without
approval of the property owners, subject to certain conditions as to
degree of development and ability to deliver services. 3 2  Local
governments have broad authority for interlocal cooperation,
including the authority to exercise power and engage in undertakings
jointly, through joint agencies, or through contracts.33 Cities and
counties have authority for some purposes to establish separate
entities, such as service districts or authorities, governed by the city or
county governing board or their appointees, but with separate
authority to tax, borrow or regulate."M They also have authority to
establish regional authorities to address issues as provided by specific
statutes.
135
To varying degrees, the statutes delegating authority to local
governments contain limitations either as to the substantive scope of
authority granted or as to procedures required for the exercise of
authority granted. In the context of local government dependence on
statutory authority, local governments must strictly comply with each
specific limitation, whether substantive or procedural in character.
Failure to comply with even the most detailed procedural
requirement makes the action subject to legal challenge and possible
invalidation.136 For example, the authority to regulate abandonment
of junked vehicles includes a definition of a junked motor vehicle,
lists factors to be considered in determining whether removal is
130. See § 158-7.1 (authorizing construction of infrastructure, acquisition of property,
and appropriation of funds to promote local industrial or commercial development).
131. See § 160A-31.
132. See § 160A-34; § 160A-46.
133. See § 160A-462.
134. See § 153A-301 (creating County Service Districts); § 160A-536 (creating
Municipal Service Districts); § 160A-552 (creating Parking Authorities); § 160A-579
(creating Public Transportation Authorities).
135. See, e.g., § 153A-422 (authorizing the creation of Regional Solid Waste
Management Authorities); § 160A-422 (authorizing Regional Transportation Authorities).
136. See Heaton v. City of Charlotte, 277 N.C. 506, 513, 178 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1971)
(holding that "a zoning ordinance or an amendment thereto which is not adopted in
accordance with the enabling statutes is invalid and ineffective"); Raynor v. Comm'rs of
Louisburg, 220 N.C. 348, 351, 17 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1941) (holding that failure to comply
with statutory requirement to advertise for bids renders contract invalid). But see
Sonopress, Inc. v. Town of Weaverville, 139 N.C. App. 378, 386, 533 S.E.2d 537, 541 (2000)
(stating that the annexation procedure statute, § 160A-38(g)(1), provides that the standard
for review of alleged procedural irregularities is whether they "materially prejudice" the
substantive rights of the petitioner).
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warranted, establishes procedural requirements for enforcement, and
places some limitations on what may be included in the ordinance.'37
In contrast, the authorization to regulate noise simply states that a
city "may by ordinance regulate, restrict, or prohibit the production
or emission of noises or amplified speech, music, or other sounds that
tend to annoy, disturb, or frighten its citizens. 138 Where the statutes
provide broad authority, the local government is free to establish the
specific definitions and regulatory provisions in the locally adopted
ordinance.
Detailed substantive and procedural limitations can be found
throughout the many important local government enabling statutes,
including planning and land-use regulation139 and annexation. 4 °
Some of the state-mandated procedures, especially notice and hearing
requirements, might otherwise be required as a matter of
constitutional due process or, as in the case of annexation, to protect
against overreaching where extraterritorial powers are granted
without requiring legislative or voter approval.
Detailed state laws also restrict local government administrative
functions, including public records, 41 open meetings,142 finance
(including budget preparation and adoption, as well as accounting
and disbursement of funds),143 procurement,'" property disposal,45
conflicts of interest, 46 and voting by the local governing board.47
137. See § 160A-303.2.
138. § 160A-184.
139. See, e.g., § 160A-364 (specifying procedures for adopting or amending subdivision
ordinances); § 160A-372 (specifying what can be included in a subdivision control
ordinance); § 160A-384 (specifying procedures for adopting zoning ordinances); § 160A-
385 (specifying procedures for amending zoning ordinances).
140. See § 160A-49 (specifying the procedure for annexation, including a notice of
intent, notice of public hearing, actions to be taken prior to informational meeting,
procedure for public informational meeting, and passage and contents of annexation
ordinance); § 160A-47 (specifying the documents the annexing municipality must prepare,
including a report and plans regarding extension of services to the annexed area).
141. See§ 132-1.
142. See § 143-318.10.
143. See § 159-7 to -38 (delineating procedures for adoption of the budget including a
balanced budget requirement, duties of finance and budget officers, minimum
requirements for the accounting for and investment of funds, and procedures and
limitations applicable to capital projects).
144. See § 143-128 to -135.9 (establishing minimum formal and informal bidding
thresholds, defining procedural requirements for advertisement and receipt of bids, listing
permissible exceptions to bidding, establishing mandatory minority participation
requirements, and listing authorized construction contracting methods).
145. See § 160A-265 to 160A-280.
146. See § 14-234.
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These laws generally apply to local governments (and, in some cases,
to state agencies) uniformly, without regard to the size of the
jurisdiction, and contain specific minimum requirements."4
With regard to certain structural aspects of local government, the
legislature has delegated what might be considered home rule
authority. Cities and counties have authority to change, without
legislative approval, specified aspects of the local government
organization and structure, including the number, terms, and method
of election of governing board members.'49 Cities have authority to
change their name 15° and "style," that is, whether they are called city,
town, or village.' These types of structural choices are probably
equivalent to those that would be considered matters of local concern
in a home rule state. 52
This summary of delegated authority in North Carolina
illustrates the wide range of subjects that are both specifically and
generally addressed in state law. While the state legislature has
delegated significant authority to address local and even
extraterritorial matters, the form in which these delegations are made
147. See § 153A-44 (delineating limited bases for which county board members may be
excused from voting); § 153A-45 (establishing county voting requirements for adopting
ordinances); § 160A-75 (establishing city procedures governing board voting, delineating
limited bases for which board members may be excused from voting, and establishing
voting requirements for adopting ordinances).
148. The public records law applies to any public body, see § 132-1; local government
finance laws apply to local governments as defined in § 159-7(c) to -7(15); procurement
laws apply to the expenditure of public funds by state and local governments, see § 143-
129; property disposal requirements apply to all cities and to counties by operation of
§ 153A-176, see § 160A-266; and the conflicts of interest laws apply to all public agencies,
see § 14-234, but do contain an exception applicable to small jurisdictions as defined in
§ 14-234(dl).
149. See § 153A-58 to 153A-64 (counties); § 160A-101 to 160A-111 (cities).
150. See § 160A-101(1).
151. See § 160A-101(2). There are no classes of cities in North Carolina, so different
styles of city do not indicate different levels of authority and do not have any other legal
significance. See § 160A-1(2) (" 'City' is interchangeable with the terms 'town' and
'village,' . . . and shall mean any city as defined in this [statute] without regard to the
terminology employed in charters, local acts, other portions of the General Statutes, or
local customary usage."). In cities, these changes may be made by the governing board by
ordinance, see § 160A-102, or upon citizen initiative, subject to a referendum, see § 160A-
102 to -104. There are no other provisions for citizen initiative, recall, or referendum in
the general laws governing North Carolina local governments, although there are a few
local charters that contain such provisions. See David M. Lawrence, Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall in North Carolina, POPULAR GOV'T, Fall 1997, at 8, 8-18. The
statutes governing counties require voter approval of locally initiated structural changes.
See § 153A-60.
152. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Structural matters are generally
understood to be included in home rule delegations. See SILVESTRI & NELSON, supra
note 1, at § 1.41.
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includes, in many cases, specific substantive and procedural
limitations. Local attorneys and other officials must understand both
the scope of authority granted as well as any procedural requirements
that apply. The dual nature of these statutes, being both enabling and
limiting, is of particular significance given the default presumption
against inherent authority. Situations inevitably arise in which it is
not clear whether a specific statute encompasses authority for a
desired program or activity and whether specific substantive or
procedural limitations exclude similar options that are not
enumerated.
Where the authority for a particular activity is not clear, local
governments may seek special legislation passed by the state
legislature-a local act-to provide clear authority.153  Local
governments also regularly seek special legislation in order to modify
specific procedural limitations contained in the general law.'54 While
there are constitutional limitations on the use of local legislation for
certain specified subjects,'55 local acts on a wide range of subjects are
easy to obtain. Under a courtesy system well established in the
general assembly, local acts that have the support of the local
delegation are usually approved unanimously by the legislature.156
Indeed, legislators often view their support of local legislation as a
tangible constituent service. In addition, it can be argued that the
local act system, when used to authorize new or innovative programs
or activities, provides a pilot system, allowing a few jurisdictions to try
out new ideas before they are authorized statewide.157 On the other
hand, the legislative landscape that shapes local authority is made
somewhat more complicated by the presence of local legislation that
modifies authority for one or more units through uncodified
provisions. Local attorneys sometimes fear that the presence of a
153. See, e.g., An Act to Authorize the Town of Caswell Beach to Regulate Golf Carts,
ch. 58, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 97 (authorizing the Town of Caswell Beach to regulate
the operation of electric golf carts on public streets within the town).
154. See, e.g., An Act to Allow the Town of Kill Devil Hills to Make Certain
Assessments Without Petition, ch. 142, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 248 (exempting the Town
of Kill Devil Hills from the requirement of a petition for the use of special assessments for
listed purposes).
155. See N.C. CONST. art. II, § 24.
156. See JOSEPH S. FERRELL, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: A
HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATORS 29-30 (7th ed. 1997).
157. See David M. Lawrence, The Legal Nature of the City and Its Governing Board, in
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 3, at 31, 34.
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local bill specifically authorizing a particular power implies that the
authority does not otherwise exist in the general law. 58
As noted earlier, local governments without home rule have no
authority except that which is specifically delegated.'59 As such, there
is significant focus on the specific language, scope, and meaning of the
numerous enabling statutes and local acts. Ultimately, questions
about the meaning of these laws are resolved by courts. The
following section addresses the legal standard courts apply in cases
analyzing the scope of local authority.
B. Judicial Interpretation
In a case involving an allegation that a local government action is
invalid for lack of statutory authority, the role of the court is often to
determine whether the challenged action is within the scope of
authority granted, even though it may not be specifically enumerated
in a statute.16° In some cases, it may also require an analysis of
whether the action is preempted, either explicitly or implicitly, by
other state legislation. 161  The basic job of the court, then, is to
determine whether the legislature intended to authorize the
challenged local action. 62 Courts are guided by standards of judicial
review through which they determine how narrowly or broadly
specific delegations should be interpreted. In the absence of
legislative statements directing courts as to the legislature's intent
158. See Owens, supra note 10, at 704 ("If one jurisdiction secures such authorization,
others often seek the same to avoid the negative implication that those without explicit
authorization do not have the power to use that tool."). It is unclear whether this fear is
justified in all cases. The implication of a lack of statutory authority is probably not
warranted in the most common case, where a local act is adopted without legislative
reference to or debate about its relation to existing law, as opposed to a case where
authority under general law is sought and denied, and then local authority is obtained.
159. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 42-44,
442 S.E.2d 45, 49-51 (1994) (applying statutory "broad construction" rule and concluding
that fee was a reasonably necessary or expedient supplementary power in case where
plaintiff challenged locally enacted fee as void for lack of statutory authority).
161. See, e.g., Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 44, 565 S.E.2d 172, 175 (2002)
(regarding whether a state law preempts county regulation of swine farms, stating that "we
look to the North Carolina General Statutes to see what power the General Assembly has
delegated broadly to counties on a statewide basis or more specifically to counties such as
Chatham in the area of swine regulation").
162. See Durham Land Owners Ass'n v. Durham County, - N.C. App .... 630
S.E.2d 200, 203 (2006) ("[I]t is the duty of the Court, where the language of a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, to adopt the construction and practical
interpretation which best expresses the intention of the Legislature .... ").
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regarding the standard of review, courts have historically applied a
narrow standard of review.
163
The Dillon's rule of judicial review was specifically developed to
address questions about the scope of local government authority.
Developed by judge and local government law scholar John F. Dillon
in the late nineteenth century, the rule states that local governments
have and may exercise only those powers that are "granted in express
words; ... those necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to the
powers expressly granted ... [and] those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but
indispensable."' ' 16  The rule further provides that "[a]ny fair,
reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied."' 65
North Carolina is often described as a "Dillon's rule state,"
meaning that in absence of home rule authority, the scope of local
authority is determined under Dillon's rule. The Dillon's rule/home
rule comparison actually sets up a false dichotomy. 166  Home rule
163. See Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 551, 554, 276 S.E.2d
443, 445 (1981) ("[I]t is generally held that statutory delegations of power to municipalities
should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to
exercise the power.").
164. JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 101-
02 (Chicago, James Cockroft & Co. 1872) (emphasis omitted). The restrictiveness of this
rule is likely a function of Dillon's concern over the abuse of local authority at the time of
his writing. He notes in the introduction to the first edition of his treatise that "the
administration of the affairs of our municipal corporations is too often both unwise and
extravagant." Id. at 22. The introduction includes recommendations for limitations on
local authority, especially in the area of debt, as well as his strongly held view that local
authority should be established by general laws. See id. at 22-26. His rule of judicial
interpretation is consistent with his view that the courts share the responsibility for seeing
that local authority is kept in check, as he notes,
The courts, too, have duties, the most important of which is to require these
corporations, in all cases, to show a plain and clear grant for the authority they
assume to exercise; to lean against constructive powers, and, with firm hands, to
hold them and their officers within chartered limits.
Id. at 25-26. While Dillon is known for his restrictive views on the scope of local
government authority, it would be an error to assume that he was hostile toward municipal
government in general. His passionately expressed view was that the system and
operation of municipal government "is, beyond controversy, the fairest to the individual
citizen, and, on the whole, the most satisfactory in its operations and results of any that has
yet been devised." Id. at 26.
165. Id. at 102.
166. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 13 ("[T]he literature treats Dillon's
Rule and home rule as polar opposites with respect to local government autonomy and
assumes that either one or the other exists in a state. But both of these assumptions are
incorrect. The two doctrines often coexist with one another and neither implies any
particular degree of local government autonomy.").
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describes the source and extent of delegation by the state, whereas
Dillon's rule is a rule of judicial interpretation that may be used
regardless of the form of delegated authority, unless the legislature
has expressed an intention for a more liberal standard.167 When the
issue is framed in this way it is clear, as the North Carolina Court of
Appeals has recently affirmed,"6 that North Carolina is not a Dillon's
rule state.
In the early 1970s the North Carolina legislature enacted a state
law expressing its intent that local government authority should be
broadly construed. The statute reads:
It is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this
State should have adequate authority to execute the powers,
duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law.
To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of city charters
shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be
construed to include any additional and supplementary powers
that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into
execution and effect: Provided, that the exercise of such
additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to
State or federal law or to the public policy of this State.169
As noted above, statutes for both cities and counties also explicitly
indicate that specific enumerations of regulatory powers are not
exclusive and do not limit authority under the broader delegation of
general ordinance-making authority.
171
North Carolina courts have not consistently heeded this
legislative directive to construe broadly local-enabling legislation.
Instead, courts have intermittently applied Dillon's rule and other
limiting rules of construction. The record of cases is quite mixed,
both in terms of outcomes (which things have been held to be within
the local government's authority and which things have not) and,
167. As noted earlier, Dillon's rule has been applied even in home rule states. See
supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 179-82.
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2005). The county provision is nearly identical except
that it does not contain the proviso regarding consistency with state and federal law. See
§ 153A-4. Though neither the broad construction provision nor the general police power
delegation for counties contain the preemption language, case law indicates that the state's
preemptive authority is preserved. See Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 50, 565
S.E.2d 172, 179 (2002) (holding that state's complete and integrated regulatory scheme
implicitly preempts local regulation of the same activity); State v. Tenore, 280 N.C. 238,
245, 185 S.E.2d 644, 648-49 (1972) (holding that statewide law preempts local ordinance
regulating the same subject).
170. See § 153A-124 (counties); § 160A-177 (cities).
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more importantly, in terms of the legal standards applied by the
courts. As documented in a recent comprehensive analysis of
Dillon's rule in North Carolina, early cases (prior to 1890) interpreted
local government authority broadly, allowing various activities that
were not specifically authorized but considered "reasonably
necessary." '171 Around the turn of the century, due to changes in
social and economic conditions, judicial interpretations became more
restrictive. 72 North Carolina courts continued to use Dillon's rule
even after the legislature enacted the "broad construction" statute,
despite the fact that the more generous standard in the statute
appears to be entirely inconsistent with the rule.'73
A watershed decision was thought to have been rendered in 1994
when the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Homebuilders
Association of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte,'74 upheld the City of
Charlotte's imposition of fees for regulatory permits, specifically
relying on the broad construction statute and refusing to apply the
more restrictive Dillon's rule formulation.175 This case did not,
however, end the court's pattern of variable judicial approaches.
Later that year the Supreme Court of North Carolina used the
Dillon's rule formulation to invalidate a local government
employment benefit policy that went beyond the provisions of the
statute governing benefits. 176  A restrictive interpretation was used
again, more recently in Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of
Durham,17 7 when the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that
171. See Owens, supra note 10, at 682.
172. See id. at 682-83 (documenting historical changes in the urban and political
environment resulting in more restrictive rulings during the turn of the century).
173. See Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 554, 276 S.E.2d
443, 445 (1981) (narrowly construing city's authority to reject bids on sale of property); see
also Owens, supra note 10, at 694-96 (documenting cases decided after enactment of the
broad construction statute).
174. 336 N.C. 37,442 S.E.2d 45 (1994).
175. Id. at 43-44, 442 S.E.2d at 49-50.
176. See Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 417-23, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287-91
(1994). The reaction of local government attorneys to this apparent turnaround was well
captured in the title of a review of the two decisions by A. Fleming Bell, II, Dillon's Rule is
Dead; Long Live Dillon's Rule!, LOc. Gov'T L. BULL., Mar. 1995 at 1. It is important to
note that the directive to use a broad construction is in Chapters 160A (cities) and 153A
(counties). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 (2005) (cities); § 153A-4 (counties). Bowers v.
City of High Point involved a narrow interpretation of a statute in Chapter 143. See
Bowers, 339 N.C. at 418-19, 451 S.E.2d at 288-89. A court may well determine that even if
broad construction displaces Dillon's rule or other restrictive default standard of judicial
interpretation, it does so only with respect to power explicitly contained in Chapters 160A
and 153A.
177. 350 N.C. 805,517 S.E.2d 874 (1999).
20061 2013
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
imposition of fees for storm 'water programs exceeded the authority
granted local governments to charge fees for utility systems.
17 8
The most significant recent case in this area exhibits a valiant
effort by the court to reconcile prior, seemingly inconsistent rulings
under a unifying standard for judicial review. Those who follow
developments in local government law may be cautiously optimistic
by strong statements in this case, but would be justified if they do not
see it as a major step toward predictability in this area of law.
In Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Laurinburg,79
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the use of a municipal
cable system for a fiber-optic network was within the scope of
authority granted to operate a "cable television system.""18 Placing
itself clearly within the Homebuilders precedent, the court relied on
the "broad construction" statute, holding that this language prevents
application of Dillon's rule in cases "where there is an ambiguity in
the authorizing language, or the powers clearly authorized reasonably
necessitate 'additional and supplementary powers' 'to carry them into
execution and effect[.]' ,181 To reconcile the prior rulings in Bowers
and Smith Chapel, the court explained that the narrow construction of
Dillon's rule is appropriate "where the plain meaning of the statute is
without ambiguity." '182
While the first part of the ruling provides a refreshingly honest
look at the variable records of prior cases, it is uncertain how much
predictability the newly enunciated standard will provide. The focus
under the new standard will be on whether a particular statute is
ambiguous, or whether instead the court must rely on the plain
meaning of the statute to determine whether the authority in question
has clearly been delegated.
In addition, courts will be responsible for deciding when powers
authorized "necessitate additional and supplementary power to carry
them into execution and effect. '183  It is difficult to discern what
evidence the courts will rely on in making this determination. In the
Bellsouth case, the court applied the new standard to determine
178. See id. at 815, 517 S.E.2d at 881. This decision was based on an application of the
"plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation. See id. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878.
179. 168 N.C. App. 75,606 S.E.2d 721 (2005), discretionary review denied, 359 N.C. 629,
615 S.E.2d 660 (2005).
180. See id. at 85-86, 606 S.E.2d at 727-28.
181. Id. at 83, 606 S.E.2d at 726 (alteration in original).
182. Id. ("[W]here the plain meaning of the statute is without ambiguity, it 'must be
enforced as written.' " (quoting Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 419-20, 451




whether a fiber-optic network falls within the plain meaning of a
cable television system as defined in the enabling statute. Concluding
that the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court applied the
broad construction rule."84 While it recognized that the legislature
could not have anticipated the technological developments that led to
the issue presented, the court upheld the city's authority, concluding
that "the legislature's intent in 1971 was to enable the municipality's
public enterprise to grow in reasonable stride with technological
advancements, as it is this advancement which marks the ever-
approaching horizon of necessity."' 5 A less sympathetic court could
have concluded that the legislature could not possibly have intended
to authorize the city to operate technology that did not exist when the
enabling law was enacted.
It is possible to understand the continuing variability in local
government authority cases in terms of the controversial or
experimental nature of the action challenged, or to explain them as
reflecting historical developments of the time.'86 Viewed in objective
terms, it may be possible to understand the divergent decisions as
reflecting an underlying philosophy of judicial restraint, which
requires deference to the legislative branch and avoidance of judicial
legislating. After all, the legislature can always correct an erroneous
court decision on the scope of authority delegated, and a deferential
judiciary might prefer to let a more democratic process resolve the
issue. 87 Even with this limited judicial role in mind, however, it is
difficult to reconcile some of the North Carolina court decisions.
Indeed, the fact that the North Carolina appellate courts do not
consistently view the broad construction and Dillon's rule concepts as
being mutually exclusive is evident in a post-Bellsouth case that cites
184. Id.
185. Id. at 86-87, 606 S.E.2d at 728.
186. Professor Owens notes that controversial issues have tended to fare poorly
throughout the history of local government authority jurisprudence and suggests that
changes in court composition may more likely explain inconsistent results than changes in
legislation or legislative intent. See Owens, supra note 10, at 700. Indeed, faculty at the
Institute of Government regularly advise local government officials to seek local
legislation if activity is controversial, affects fundamental rights, or has extraterritorial
effect.
187. As Professor Owens has documented, the legislature promptly responded to the
ruling in Smith Chapel and enacted specific authority for storm water program fees. See
Owens, supra note 10, at 698 n.141. This event can be viewed in different ways. Either it
is proof that judicial restraint was appropriate since the legislature has the power to clarify
its intent and that, in doing so, the political process was able to function in creating the
final version of the law, or it is proof that the court was wrong about the legislature's
intent and it was inefficient for the legislature to have to correct the error.
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both standards in describing the general scope of local government
authority.
18
Thus, while North Carolina local governments have been
delegated extensive authority, the form and specific wording of
enabling statutes has the potential to limit flexibility in
implementation. Although many local activities do not become the
subject of legal challenges, the experience for local governments
when they are has been mixed. Judicial review of delegated authority
still appears to be unpredictable despite the specific legislative
directive for broad construction that has existed for over thirty years.
III. COMPARING NORTH CAROLINA TO HOME RULE STATES
A. Assessing Home Rule
Is home rule better than non-home rule? There is, of course, no
universal, objective answer to this question.189 It is important to
frame this question, and indeed to approach any comparison of the
systems of delegation, in terms of what interests are considered and
what objectives or conditions are of concern. While a complete
analysis of the effects of varying degrees of local autonomy is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is interesting to consider the various
perspectives from which this issue is often addressed. It has been
argued that from a purely structural standpoint, home rule is
important "because it fills a gap in our legal system-the lack of any
place for local governments in our legal structure." 190  Another
observer argues that "[s]ince local government autonomy and
capacity are critical elements of ... [public sector] reform proposals,
the legal theory of local government as a 'creature of the state' cannot
continue as a feature of the intergovernmental framework."19'
Indeed, the argument for autonomy based on the scope and
188. See Campbell v. City of Laurinburg, 168 N.C. App. 566, 571, 608 S.E.2d 98, 100
(2005). This case refers to the powers "necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
power expressly granted," see id. (quoting Madry v. Scotland Neck, 214 N.C. 461, 462, 199
S.E. 618, 619 (1938)), and cites N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4 in the same paragraph, see id.
189. See Briffault, supra note 89, at 256 (arguing that "130 years after the birth of the
home rule concept, its meaning remains controversial, uncertain, and highly variable").
190. Id. Briffault argues that home rule provides "some appropriate formal legal
recognition of the distinctive and important place of local governments in the federal-
state-local, and especially the state-local, governmental scheme." Id. at 257.
191. Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 102, at 7.
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importance of local government services and regulations in current
society is compelling.
192
Given the continuing preemptive role states have, even under
most forms of home rule, it is difficult to see how home rule provides
more recognition than other forms of delegated authority. Indeed,
the role and importance of local governments in North Carolina
cannot be said to be less significant than in it is in home rule states.
As the state-to-state comparison of local government authority
observes, "[o]n the surface, North Carolina appears to be in want of
local autonomy, but a complex mix of provisions and practices
enhances the position and integrity of local governments. 193
For local government advocates, including local government
officers and their professional organizations, the question is framed in
terms of whether home rule is better for local governments.194 These
stakeholders, not surprisingly, argue that greater authority is
necessary to respond to increasingly complex problems and to
develop ways to provide services in the face of fewer resources,
greater demands for services, and increasing "unfunded mandates."
According to one observer, "[l]ocal officials want more revenue,
more financial authority, more state aid, more discretion in spending
funds, and fewer expensive mandates."'195 As noted earlier, this desire
is often disappointed, even in home rule states. A recent study of
cities in Massachusetts concluded that home rule as it operates in that
state actually hinders local governments in their efforts to resolve
local problems.
96
Home rule has also been evaluated in terms of how it affects
social problems in modem America. Thus, there are those who argue
either for or against increased home rule based on its impact on
particular issues, such as smart growth or urban sprawl. 97 For
example, some argue that sprawl is a direct result of too much local
192. See Briffault, supra note 89, at 256. "[Tlhe vast majority of public services are
provided, and much critical public regulation is undertaken, at the local level.
Approximately three-quarters of the total number of state and local employees are
actually employed by local governments." Id.
193. Svara, supra note 9, at 312.
194. See David R. Berman, State-Local Relations: Authority, Finances, Takeovers, 2004
MUN. Y.B. 45, 45 (2004) (observing that local government officials are increasingly
concerned about threats to home rule powers, state intervention and the state's growing
interest in the structure of local governments, and point to preemption and cutback in aid
as major problems).
195. Id. at 47.
196. BARRON, FRUG, & Su, supra note 13, at xi-xiii.
197. See generally Barron, supra note 102 (summarizing the role of home rule in the
debates over urban sprawl).
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autonomy, while others argue that the solution to sprawl lies in
increasing that autonomy.
198
Home rule, together with liberal laws allowing incorporation of
suburban areas, has also been criticized as contributing to social and
economic inequity. The following example of this admittedly
normative analysis proposes that
the virtues of enhancing local autonomy tend to be greatly
exaggerated. Localism reflects territorial economic and social
inequalities and reinforces them with political power. Its
benefits accrue primarily to a minority of affluent localities, to
the detriment of other communities and to the system of local
government as a whole .... Localist ideology and local
political action tend not to build up public life, but rather
contribute to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of
contemporary American politics. Localism may be more of an
obstacle to achieving social justice and the development of
public life than a prescription for their attainment.'99
Home rule is often promoted, on the other hand, as an important
component of a healthy democracy in that it encourages participation
at the local level and provides a sense of individual empowerment
that is critical to the success of democracy. 200 Local autonomy is
necessary, it is argued, because "[p]eople will bother to participate in
local government decision making only if local governments have real
power over matters important to local people. ' '20 1 Recent history
suggests, however, that where citizens had a choice, they sometimes
opposed increasing local autonomy through home rule because of a
concern that it will lead to increased taxes and excess regulation.' °
198. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 34 (concluding that Dillon's Rule is not a
key influence on growth management efforts). See generally Barron, supra note 102
(tracing the history of home rule and its role in the sprawl debates and arguing for a
rejuvenated role for home rule in combating sprawl).
199. Briffault, supra note 13, at 1-2; see also Briffault, supra note 3, at 425 (arguing that
economic localism reinforces inequality and does not support extending local autonomy).
200. See Briffault, supra note 89, at 258 (arguing that citizen participation at the local
level is easier and more satisfying, promotes national democracy, and requires local
autonomy); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1070
(1980).
201. Briffault, supra note 89, at 258. Note than in an earlier piece, Briffault argued that
the link between local government and greater citizen participation is uncertain and
undocumented, see Briffault, supra note 3, at 397, and that the large number and
inequitable development of local governments actually lessens both the significance and
likelihood of local political participation, see id. at 407.
202. See Stanley Ziemba, Four South Suburbs Try to Gain Home Rule, CHI. TRIB.
(South-Southwest ed.), Mar. 2, 2004, § 2, at 2 ("It's the revenue-raising power that tends to
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Citizens and local government officials are only two of the
groups one can identify as being affected by local government
autonomy. Other groups include businesses and interest groups
(those organized groups who represent discrete interests of particular
groups of citizens or businesses), as well as state legislators and
executive officers. For these stakeholders, the allocation of authority
between state and local governments may have an impact on their
effectiveness in promoting desired policies and laws. A lobbyist for a
statewide organization, along with many state-level legislators and
officials, may feel that it is more efficient and politically effective to
debate important issues, including some involving purely local
matters, in one state-level forum rather than in many individual
localities. While this dichotomy is reflected in the case law as courts
are called upon to determine what is of local or statewide interest,"3 it
can be argued that statewide organizations and legislatures are in a
better position to determine which issues require uniform, statewide
treatment than are the courts. When presented with proposals for
change, legislators are reluctant to give up control of authority and
often view the state's role in controlling local activities as an
important check on local favoritism or inequity, while business
interests opposed to home rule proposals have argued that local home
rule would lead to a "crazy quilt of conflicting local laws. ' ' 2°4
B. Home Rule for North Carolina
Do North Carolina local governments need home rule? Clearly
there are multiple and conflicting views about the effect home rule
may or may not have on various normative values and issues
presently facing citizens of local governments (who are, or course,
also citizens of state and federal governments). 25  Whatever the
actual effects of home rule may be, it is difficult to imagine that the
bring out opponents."). A study conducted in Illinois, however, concluded that home rule
was not a significant factor in local taxation but had an effect on regulatory powers. See
Tom Rooney, Local Government Revenue Structure: Does Home Rule Matter?, 32 J.
REGIONAL ANALYSIS & POL'Y 67, 76-77 (2002), available at http://www.wisc.edu/urpll
rap/pastvolumes2000v3232-1-4.pdf.
203. See supra notes 53-74 and accompanying text.
204. See Berman, supra note 194, at 50 (summarizing recent home rule proposals in
New Hampshire, Michigan, and Missouri); see also Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 102, at
2 (presenting arguments for and against home rule).
205. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a
Democratic Defense of City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2011-12 (2000) (reviewing
GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS (1999)) (arguing that there is a lack of empirical evidence about what local
governments really do and why).
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effects of North Carolina's non-home rule structure are significantly
different. North Carolina, with its substantial delegations of authority
to local governments, liberal incorporation and annexation policies,
and fair share of economic inequity and political history, is probably
not distinguishable from the other local governments praised or
criticized by advocates in these normative debates.
The question addressed in this Article intentionally sidesteps the
value-laden assessment of whether home rule is good or bad, either in
general or in terms of particular social issues. Instead, the question is
whether North Carolina local governments need home rule to
improve flexibility, efficiency, and predictability in carrying out the
functions for which they are responsible. This comparison does not
attempt to identify which issues should be addressed locally rather
than at the state level. Instead it recognizes the practical reality that
in both home rule and non-home rule states, the legislature retains
and is unlikely to relinquish significant authority to legislate on
matters, including matters some may consider to be purely local, that
it considers to be important enough to address through statewide
legislation.2 °6
For purposes of this discussion, flexibility means the ability of the
local government to use various approaches to carry out its delegated
authority. This argument does not reflect a preference for more
authority, but instead a preference for experimentation and tailoring
of programs locally within the parameters set by the state in the
statutory delegation. Efficiency means the ability of government at
both the state and local level to implement policies and deliver
services with a minimum of procedural delay. This includes
minimizing the need for interpretations by courts or by clarifying
legislative action, as well as providing maximum discretion in local
administrative arrangements for carrying out delegated powers.
Predictability means the ability of governmental officials, citizens,
businesses, and other interested stakeholders to know what authority
local governments have been given and to understand, again, with
minimal need for judicial or legislative clarification, the scope and
limitations of that authority.
206. See Berman, supra note 194, at 47. Berman quotes a West Virginia state legislator
as saying, "I've never heard anyone in the legislature say they were against home rule.
But when the doors are closed, they don't want to give up the revenue, the power, the
authority." Id. (quoting Josh Hafenbrack, Mayors Want More Tax Tools; West Virginia




As documented in Home Rule in America, the actual discretion
and authorized powers of local governments varies significantly, even
among states classified as having home rule.207 For many kinds of
local government activities, North Carolina local government
authority is essentially equivalent to that enjoyed in home rule states.
A Brookings Institution study of Dillon's rule, which includes an
analysis of local government autonomy, ranks North Carolina third
nationally.2 8
On the issue of state preemption, it is clear that home rule can,
but does not always, make a difference. In those cases where a home
rule delegation has been interpreted to limit the authority of the state
to legislate on local matters, there is perhaps some greater
predictability for local governments. This potential advantage must
certainly be offset, however, by the difficulty of discerning which
matters are of local concern, as ultimately determined by the courts.
As described in Part I of this Article, for most jurisdictions it appears
that home rule does not significantly reduce the potential for state
legislative preemption of many areas of interest to local governments.
As noted in the preceding section, judicial interpretation of local
government authority is not significantly more predictable in many
home rule states than it is in North Carolina. While the standard of
review has varied in North Carolina despite the presence of legislative
direction, commonly litigated issues in home rule states have also
created a lack of predictability.20 9 It appears that a specific legislative
directive, rather than the mere existence of home rule authority, is
often necessary to override the courts' tendency to interpret local
authority narrowly. Questions about whether matters are of state or
local concern and about whether local provisions conflict with state
general laws have also been subject to varying interpretations by
courts in home rule states. As noted above, the legal analysis of
implicit preemption is similar and commonly applied in both home
rule and non-home rule states, and reflects the basic structure of
states' superior authority regardless of how local authority is
delegated.
207. See Krane, Rigos & Hill, supra note 24, at 475 (showing substantial diversity of
home rule and local government discretionary authority across the fifty states). "Home
rule encompasses substantial interstate variation in the choices accorded local officials
over many different types of policy decisions." Id.
208. RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 6, at 26-27.
209. See id. at 16 ("The multitude and difficulty of issues raised by home rule lead to
many more cases in state courts interpreting home rule than Dillon's Rule.").
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Perhaps the most significant difference between the home rule
and non-home rule states is that authority in non-home rule states is
delegated through individual statutes, rather than in one or more
broad delegations. As noted earlier, however, this difference is
diminished with respect to those home rule states in which authority
is enumerated in specific statutory provisions. 1°  Since North
Carolina local governments act pursuant only to specific statutory
authority and without any presumption in favor of authority over
local matters, the scope of authority is directly affected by the specific
wording of each individual statute. The number and specificity of
enabling statutes amplifies the potential for uncertainty and legal
challenge. The broader delegation of authority in home rule states
allows more activity to be undertaken without specific limitation, and
reduces the opportunities for challenge, except upon the broader
issues of state versus local concern, or conflict with general laws, as
described above.
Flexibility is also diminished by limitations contained in some
enabling laws under which North Carolina local governments
operate. While some specific procedural requirements may well be
politically important, others are not. It may be argued that some
consistency in procedural requirements may benefit consumers of
local government law, including citizens and businesses. For example,
having general laws that require all local governments to follow the
same procedures for notice of meetings or letting of contracts may
make it easier for citizens and businesses to participate in, and
contract with, local governments throughout the state. It is difficult,
on the other hand, to perceive the political importance of a state law
that specifies which contracts that have been publicly bid must be
approved by the governing board and which do not.2"
Under the home rule framework, preemptive general laws are
likely to address issues of political weight, leaving the details of most
functions to the local unit. The numerous statutes that together
define local government authority in North Carolina vary significantly
in the extent to which they do or do not leave the details of
implementation to the local unit, and the legislature has no explicit or
implicit standard or protocol for determining how to frame enabling
authority. It is an ad hoc process that is a function of the individual
circumstances and events surrounding the enactment and subsequent
amendment of each statute over time. While this process exists in
210. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
211. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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home rule states as well, it does not affect all of the local
government's authority; only that which the state sees fit to regulate
by general law.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing analysis does not provide a strong case for a major
change in the legal structure of local government authority in North
Carolina. North Carolina local governments have been delegated
substantial and broad powers, and the state relies upon local
governments to deliver essential services to the citizens of the state.212
It seems unlikely that there will be support for a change in the non-
home rule status in North Carolina. There is no political call for a
constitutional amendment, and it seems unlikely that the legislature
would support any significant diminution in its ability to make
statewide law in its discretion. Further, it does not appear that North
Carolina local governments need home rule, at least in the form that
it exists in most states, in order to secure broader or more
comprehensive authority over key local government issues. As shown
above, North Carolina local government authority is probably as
broad as local government authority in many home rule states. To
the extent that home rule is seen as an avenue toward freedom from
state involvement in issues perceived to be local in nature, the sense
of a need for home rule is probably misplaced. On the other hand,
the system of delegation in North Carolina is complicated and may
create more uncertainty and lack of flexibility in implementation than
is necessary.
The following recommendations are intended to improve
flexibility, efficiency and predictability in carrying out delegated local
authority.
(1) Reduce unnecessary statutory detail. The legislature should
impose upon itself a practice of wording enabling legislation as
broadly as possible, specifically avoiding detail-whether substantive
or procedural-that does not promote important statewide policies.213
The legislative body and its staff should scrutinize legislative wording
212. See Wicker, supra note 3, at 27 ("City governments in North Carolina play a major
role in providing the services and the functions that are needed in an increasingly urban
society.").
213. As a practical matter, what constitutes important statewide policy will be
determined by the actual political process based on the extent to which legislators perceive
a statewide need, or the extent to which constituents or other lobbying interests organize
to promote particular positions. Where statewide policy issues are not implicated,
implementation of authorized powers should be left to local discretion.
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with an eye toward maintaining local flexibility in implementation
and administration wherever possible, adding specific limitations only
when necessary to resolve policy issues of statewide importance. This
would be consistent with the stated policy that the legislature intends
to delegate sufficient authority to "carry ... into execution and
effect" the authorized activity.214
This recommendation could be implemented prospectively. In
addition, a process could be undertaken to review and recommend
changes in existing law in order to establish a consistent degree of
specificity, leaving detail in only where it is deemed to be legally or
politically necessary. Implementation of this approach to drafting
and amending enabling legislation could provide flexibility in local
administration and possibly reduce the need for local bills modifying
mandated procedures.
An example illustrates the potential benefit of this
recommendation. Under current law, there are many requirements
for providing advertised notice of various types of local government
actions. Some include minimum times,215 minimum size,216 specific
media,2 17 and specific content.218 These specific requirements are in
addition to a broader general statute that identifies the minimum
requirements for all published notices called for under state law.
2 19
As noted earlier, the North Carolina courts have held that failure to
comply with procedural requirements is a basis for invalidation of the
action.220
While there is a strong public policy favoring public notice of
governmental activities, the North Carolina statutes do not reflect a
consistent or comprehensive approach to the provision of public
information about specific government actions. And while official
meetings of public bodies are subject to general notice
214. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-4 (2005) (delegating authority "reasonably expedient
to the exercise of the power"); § 160A-4.
215. See § 143-129(b) (stating that in letting of public contracts, a minimum of one
week must pass between the time of advertisement and the time of bid opening).
216. See § 160A-384(b) (stating that advertisement giving notice of proposed
amendments to zoning regulations shall not be less than one-half of a newspaper page in
size).
217. See § 143-129(b) (stating that electronic advertisement of proposed public contract
must be approved by governing board).
218. See § 158-7.1(c) (stating that notice of hearing related to local development
expenditures shall describe interest to be acquired, proposed acquisition cost, governing
body's intent to approve the acquisition, and such other information needed to reasonably
describe the acquisition).
219. See § 1-597 (requiring general circulation and a local subscription basis).
220. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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requirements,22' the more particularized notice requirements do not
necessarily reflect the most important or controversial matters a local
government might undertake. Indeed, the form and medium for
providing notice may vary based not only on the subject matter, but
also on the size and sophistication of the community. Principles of
flexibility and efficiency would suggest that detailed procedures
should be specified only in those cases where a statewide standard is
necessary to protect important policy goals that exist in all or most
local communities. Statewide procedures for involuntary annexation
or condemnation of property may be more justifiable on policy
grounds than statewide requirements for most regulatory or
contracting activities at the local level. Even where statutes include
specific options that may be used at the local government's discretion,
such as the choice to advertise electronically for certain matters, if
this option appears only in certain statutes, it raises the implication
that the option is not available in other contexts. Under the approach
recommended here, options would be left open in all cases unless
specific minimum requirements were deemed necessary on a
statewide basis.
A similar approach could be taken regarding statutes that
specifically require governing board approval for certain actions.222
These do not follow a consistent pattern, and in some cases they are
modified in local charters by local act. While the requirement for
board approval in many cases may reflect a desire by the state
legislature that certain decisions be made in public, the wide variation
in the size of units governed by identical provisions makes strict rules
in this area inappropriate. A legislative statement that governing
board approval for local government actions is not required unless a
particular statute specifically calls for it would go a long way toward
clarifying this issue under the current law. This recommendation
suggests that the choice about how decision making should be
delegated within a jurisdiction should generally be left to the
governing board's discretion except in cases where board action and
public notice is considered essential.
As these examples illustrate, this recommendation seeks to focus
attention at the state level on the trade-off between specificity and
flexibility, and to promote the notion that the creation of procedural
limitations should be undertaken for politically important purposes
221. See § 143-318.12.
222. Of the exceptions to the competitive bidding requirements listed in § 143-129(e)
and (g), only two require board approval, but there is no obvious distinction among them
that would explain this difference.
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rather than through inattention or force of habit. The legislature
could adopt the position that enabling legislation should avoid
specifying procedures for implementation 223 unless deemed essential
by the legislature to carry out intended statewide policy, including the
policy of promoting uniformity where the legislature deems it to be
necessary. Though it is not always easy to determine when uniformity
is essential, it seems more appropriate for this determination to be
made by the legislature than by the courts.
(2) Clarify the standard of judicial review. The legislature should
clarify the scope and applicability of the broad construction statute.
First, the legislature should clarify whether the broad construction
statute is intended to apply to authority granted outside the scope of
Chapters 160A and 153A. As currently written, the directive for
broad construction relates only to powers granted in those chapters
and in local acts, including charters. 24 In reality, however, local
government authority can be found in multiple sections of the
General Statutes, including many important provisions outside the
basic city and county statutes.225 While the legislature may not intend
to extend the broad construction language to all delegated authority,
it seems appropriate that the standard should apply to police power
regulations and similar actions that are authorized in other chapters.
The legislature should revise the broad construction directive so that
it applies to all delegated authority except those exempted. Through
this approach, the legislature could specifically list any subjects,
chapters, or specific grants of authority to which the directive would
223. Even the author of the restrictive Dillon's rule of judicial interpretation believed
that a more deferential standard should apply to the mode adopted for carrying out
authorized powers:
The rule of strict construction does not apply to the mode adopted by the
municipality to carry into effect powers expressly or plainly granted, where the
mode is not limited or prescribed by the legislature, and is left to the discretion of
the municipal authorities .... [T]he usual test of the ... act ... is, Whether it is
reasonable? and there is no presumption against the municipal action in such
cases.
DILLON, supra note 75, § 239(91) at 453.
224. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-4, 160A-4 (stating that "the provisions of this
chapter... shall be broadly construed" (emphasis added)).
225. Chapters that contain authority for local government activity include: motor
vehicles, chapter 20 (such as § 20-141 which contains speed restrictions); social services,
chapter 108A; environmental regulation and pollution control, chapters 113, 113A, and
143; public contracts, article 8 of chapter 143; mental health, chapter 122C; public health,
chapter 130A, housing authorities, chapter 157; economic development, section 158-7.1;
local government finance, article 3 of chapter 159; water and sewer systems, chapter 162A.
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not apply, rather than leaving it to the courts to determine its
application beyond the basic city and county chapters.
Second, the legislature should revise the broad construction
statute to correct the ongoing inconsistency in judicial review of local
government authority. As noted above, even the most recent
interpretation of the broad construction statute falls short of fully
implementing the current broad construction directive. Without
diminishing the state's role in creating local government authority, or
its power of explicit and implicit preemption, the legislature could
clarify that as to those powers that are delegated, courts must
interpret them broadly. This would mean explicitly stating that the
plain meaning of the statute is not restrictive and that powers beyond
those plainly delegated are included if necessary to carry out the
authority delegated, or as long as the powers are reasonably and
appropriately related226 and not in conflict with other laws.
Another approach would be to amend the broad construction
statute to create a presumption stating that additional and
supplemental power shall be considered to be included unless
specifically or implicitly preempted. This would, in effect, reverse the
provision in Dillon's rule requiring any fair, reasonable doubt as to
whether authority exists to be resolved against the local government.
As noted earlier, this approach has been taken in several home rule
states.227 This formulation seems more consistent with the legislative
directive of broad construction than the approach most recently
enunciated by the court. The effect of the presumption would be to
place upon a challenger the burden of demonstrating that the action
is not reasonably related to delegated authority, or is in conflict with
other law.
These recommendations give meaning and effect to the decades-
old legislative statement of intention for broad construction. Like the
first recommendation, this is not an argument for an increase in
authority for local governments. The notion is that, given a legislative
directive for broad construction, it is more efficient for the legislature
to exercise its authority to preempt those areas where authority is not
intended than for local governments through individual clarifying
local acts or litigation to delineate the scope of authority already
granted.
226. As noted earlier, this approach was used by North Carolina courts earlier in our
history. See Owens, supra note 10, at 682 (stating that local governments "must have the
choice of means adopted to ends and are not confined to any one mode of operation").
227. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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(3) Authorize local ordinances to conform city charters and
county local acts to the general law. This final recommendation is for
a minor procedural improvement that could be made with a statutory
amendment for cities and counties that allow locally enacted
structural changes.228 The legislature regularly enacts local laws to
align charters and other local acts for cities and counties with the
general law, but the need for legislative involvement is purely
technical.229 There should be no need for legislative approval when
the local unit's preference is to conform the charter provision, or
previously enacted local act, to the otherwise applicable general
law.230
CONCLUSION
Despite their lack of official recognition in our federalist
structure, it is clear that local governments across the country in both
home rule and non-home rule states carry out essential functions that
affect our daily lives and have become essential in the administration
of state and federal programs. As shown in this Article, authority
granted to local governments is quite broad in both home rule and
non-home rule states. If the notion that local governments in North
Carolina need home rule is based upon the idea that it would provide
greater freedom from state preemption, the notion is based on a false
assumption. Incorporation of some aspects of home rule authority
into the North Carolina structure, however, could better effectuate
the legislative directive for broad construction. No doubt one or
more of the recommendations in this Article, if adopted, might be
viewed as favoring one set of stakeholders over another.
Stakeholders are likely to disagree on the effect of local government
authority based on their perception of its impact on particular issues
regardless of the particular structure involved. The changes
suggested here are designed to bring the law of local government
228. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., An Act to Provide that Filling of Vacancies in the Offices of Register of
Deeds, Sheriff, and County Commissioner in Beaufort County Shall be in Accordance
with General Law, ch. 263, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 606 (repealing a Beaufort County
local act in order to conform the law in that county to the general laws); An Act
Amending the Charter of the Town of Wrightsville Beach to Allow the Town to Appoint
a Board of Adjustment as Provided by General Law, ch. 265, § 1, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 607
(conforming the Town of Wrightsville Beach Charter to the general law regarding
appointment of the Board of Adjustment).
230. Section 160A-3 does authorize cities to elect to use either their charter provisions
or the general law, but where provisions are inconsistent and the charter provision does
not purport to contain all the acts necessary to carry out the authorized activity, the statute
provides that the charter provision controls. See § 160A-3(b).
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authority in North Carolina, as it exists in statutes and cases, more in
line with expressed legislative intent, and to improve the ability of
local governments to carry into effect the many functions and
responsibilities they have been delegated.
2030 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84
